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Diffusion Across Political Systems:  
The Global Spread of National Human 
Rights Institutions
Thomas Pegram*
AbSTRAcT 
This article examines the proliferation of national human rights institutions 
(NHRIs) and seeks to explain the drivers of this institutional innovation 
across contrasting political regimes. This article suggests that the NHRI 
phenomenon can be attributed to increasingly sophisticated international 
organizational platforms and three distinct, but complementary, mechanisms 
of diffusion: (1) coercion, (2) acculturation, and (3) persuasion. The article 
argues that a powerful international process of diffusion is at work and 
NHRIs are no longer the exclusive preserve of liberal democratic regimes. 
Instead NHRIs have diffused to a wide range of political systems, subject-
ing these human rights institutions to new and often competing demands 
and expectations. 
I. INTRoDUcTIoN
A striking phenomenon of recent years is the spread of national human rights 
institutions (NHRIs) far beyond liberal democratic jurisdictions. Mandated 
to protect and promote citizens’ human rights, NHRIs are established in 
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countries across the globe, and in a wide range of political systems. The 
implantation of NHRIs in regions as diverse as Africa, Asia-Pacific, Latin 
America, and the Middle East contributes to a contemporary trend toward 
the diffusion of constitutional innovations across international boundaries 
and political systems with unpredictable consequences.1 
The NHRI offers a particularly compelling subject of analysis. Most 
political systems have established in law a variant of an NHRI, but not all 
of these political systems can be considered consolidated democracies. 
Instead, most adopting states present relatively hybrid forms of democracy, 
from those with a loose adherence to democratic constitutionalism, to even 
those states enduring dictatorships. In recent years, research on NHRIs has 
turned away from often highly positivist analyses toward taking a more po-
litical and multidisciplinary approach.2 Among a myriad of issues raised by 
this nascent research agenda, it is increasingly apparent that the diffusion of 
an NHRI in any one instance cannot be considered in isolation from global 
antecedents and trends. 
The diffusion of institutional forms has been most evident in norms 
relating to human rights. However, diffusion of institutional forms is also 
apparent in political democracy and regulatory practices. The global expan-
sion of the NHRI template is a complex phenomenon, raising questions of 
diverse origins, and the impact of new institutional arrangements. This article 
restricts its attention primarily to the former concern. However, reflecting 
the difficulties inherent in discretely compartmentalizing process from out-
come, this article engages with the idea that paths to reform may have an 
important bearing on the resulting configuration of new institutional forms. 
Such an observation is pertinent to discussion of new human rights bodies 
as a possible missing link in the transmission of international human rights 
norms and their implementation at the domestic level. 
The diffusion of the NHRI follows a contagion logic in the sense that 
one instance of establishment appears to increase the probability of another 
such occurrence within a fairly circumscribed period of time. This results in 
spatial and temporal clustering of NHRIs. Rather than the notion of contagion, 
it is diffusion theory that offers the most promising theoretical avenue for 
explaining the spread of NHRIs. Strang defines diffusion as a “process where 
prior adoption of a trait or practice in a population alters the probability of 
adoption for remaining non-adopters.”3 Processes of international socializa-
 1. See Human RigHts Commissions and ombudsman offiCes: national expeRienCes tHRougHout tHe 
WoRld (Kamal Hossain et al. eds., 2000).
 2. See linda C. Reif, tHe ombudsman, good goveRnanCe and tHe inteRnational Human RigHts 
system (2004); see also Julie a. meRtus, Human RigHts matteRs: loCal politiCs and national 
Human RigHts institutions (2009); Fredrik Uggla, The Ombudsman in Latin America, 36 
J. latin am. stud. 423 (2004).
 3. David Strang, Adding Social Structure to Diffusion Models: An Event History Framework, 
19 soC. metHods & Res. 324, 325 (1991).
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tion, through the transmission of norms from organizational platforms at the 
international and regional level to individual states identified by Finnemore 
and Sikkink, are instructive when reflecting on an increasingly sophisticated 
normative framework governing NHRIs.4 
The manner and degree to which wider normative forces shape the 
behavior of states within their wider regional or international social system 
is a matter of contention. Drawing on the work of Goodman and Jinks, this 
article emphasizes three classes of diffusion mechanism, leading to contrast-
ing modes of diffusion, in order to explain the spread of the ombudsman: 
(1) coercion leading to compliance; (2) acculturation leading to conformity; 
and (3) persuasion leading to habituation.5 Each class of mechanism entails 
different actors, levels of analysis, and predictive assumptions concerning 
actor autonomy and behavior, without denying potential for overlap. The 
three distinct, but complementary, logics of diffusion will be contrasted in 
this article, with consideration of both rational and constructivist explana-
tions. However, for the purposes of explaining diffusion of institutions such as 
NHRIs, coercion may be problematic—at least in its most simplistic form.
By observing the co-variation of NHRI diffusion globally and the cor-
relation of institutional form, diffusion mechanism, and political regime, 
this article’s analysis provides a useful platform from which to explore the 
interactions between these different internal and external dimensions of in-
stitutional transfer. The resulting distribution of NHRIs by regime types points 
to certain trends: a predominance of classical ombudsman in consolidated 
democracies, human rights ombudsmen in a range of hybrid democratic 
regimes, and the human rights commissions present in the widest range of 
political systems, from Denmark to Afghanistan and Iran. The fact that NHRIs 
have spread across so many different regimes is indicative of a powerful 
international diffusion process in play. 
It has been argued that the establishments of new institutional forms 
within broader processes of transition to democracy result from a primarily 
domestic political process.6 Importantly, diffusion analysis recognizes the 
increasing potency of external agency in recent years. In the case of NHRIs, 
its historical spread and resulting structural configuration, with the possible 
exception of the Swedish paradigm of 1809, arose from the interaction be-
tween local political conditions and the international social system. In other 
words, the constellation of interests present in the domestic political realm 
has a bearing on the receptiveness of the adopting state to international 
 4. See Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political 
Change, 52 int’l oRg. 887 (1998).
 5. See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and Interna-
tional Human Rights Law, 54 duke l.J. 621, 630 (2004).
 6. See generally tRansitions fRom autHoRitaRian Rule: latin ameRiCa (Guillermo O’Donnell et 
al. eds., 1986).
Vol. 32732 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
context. In turn, the formulation of instruments of influence, combined or 
in isolation—be they coercive, acculturative, or persuasive—may be tailored 
to the attitudinal orientation of the target, reflecting the relative leverage 
of international platforms vis-à-vis domestic political forces. The complex 
domestic, regional, and international interaction of actors, arenas, and mo-
dalities of diffusion also helps to account for the unintended consequences 
often associated with NHRIs.
II. NATIoNAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIoNS (NHRIS)
The contemporary departure point for discussion of NHRIs is the Paris 
Principles (Principles), devised in 1991 and adopted by the United Nations 
(UN) General Assembly in 1993.7 This document provides an internationally 
recognized standard for such institutions. As developed in the following sec-
tion, the Principles reflect the codification of decades of intermittent atten-
tion to these entities. In formulating a generic configuration of NHRIs, the 
Principles pay particular attention to the formal independence, competence, 
mandate, and composition of the institution:
•	 Established	in	the	national	constitution	or	by	law;
•	 Role	of	 the	institution	is	clearly	specified	and	the	mandate	is	as	broad	as	
possible;
•	 Pluralism	in	governing	structures	and	independence	of	appointment	proce-
dures; 
•	 Infrastructure	 commensurate	 to	 functions,	 with	 particular	 importance	 at-
tached to the need for adequate funding;
•	 Ability	to	perform	a	monitoring,	advisory	and	recommendation	function	on	
various matters relating to human rights;
•	 Institution	relates	to	regional	and	international	organizations;
•	 Requirement	to	promote	public	awareness,	teaching	and	research	on	human	
rights; and
•	 The	possibility	 that	NHRIs	possess	quasi-jurisdictional	 functions,	e.g., the 
handling of individual complaints or petitions on human rights grounds.
 7. See Principles Relating to the Status and Functioning of National Institutions for the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, adopted 20 Dec. 1993, G.A. Res. 48/134, 
U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/ 48/141 (1993); Report of the International 
Workshop on National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 
Comm’n on Hum. Rts., 48th Sess., Agenda Item 11(b), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1992/43 
(1991).
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The correct application of the NHRI label to institutions that fulfill the above 
criteria, to a greater or lesser extent, is a matter of debate. Recent surveys 
suggest that by 2003 there were approximately fifty-five national-level hu-
man rights ombudsmen worldwide,8 a significant increase from one survey’s 
findings of only eight NHRIs in 1990.9 The UN-affiliated International Coor-
dinating Committee of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protec-
tion of Human Rights (ICCNI) identifies 119 NHRIs, with sixty-three fully 
accredited NHRIs in accordance with the Principles.10 
Within the broad designation of NHRIs there exists considerable design 
variation across a range of dimensions. This article uses three paradigm 
models as its conceptual framework: the classical ombudsman, human 
rights commission, and human rights ombudsman.11 Particular contestation 
surrounds the inclusion of the ombudsman form within this categorization, 
principally due to issues of composition and function.12 It is argued here that 
such a judgment a priori fails to take into account the historical genealogy 
of NHRIs, variation in the composition of ombudsmen at all levels of per-
sonnel, and, fundamentally, the formal and de facto human rights function 
of classical ombudsmen recognized within various international standards 
as elaborated below. 
A. The classical ombudsman
The historical genesis of NHRIs can be traced back to two distinct traditions, 
the ombudsman and the commission of inquiry.13 The classical Swedish 
model of the ombudsman is a single appointee elected by parliament and 
empowered to investigate, and prosecute if necessary, grievances of the 
citizenry against the public bureaucracy pertaining to legality and adminis-
trative fairness. Sweden, the original classical template, displays a structural 
 8. Reif, supra note 2, at 11.
 9. moRten kJæRum, danisH inst. foR Hum. Rts., national Human RigHts institutions implementing 
Human RigHts 5 (2003), available at http://www.nhri.net/pdf/NHRI-Implementing%20
human%20rights.pdf.
10. Report of the Second International Workshop on National Institutions for the Promo-
tion and Protection of Human Rights, U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., 50th Sess., 
Agenda Item 11(b), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/45 (1993). The ICCNI was created in 1993 
at the second international workshop on National Institutions for the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights held in Tunis. Id.
11. This article does not consider ombudsman-type institutions that operate in the private 
sector, at the sub-national level, or within highly restrictive mandates. 
12. See Birgit Lindsnaes & Lone Lindholt, National Human Rights Institutions: Standard Setting 
and Achievements, in danisH CentRe foR Human RigHts, national Human RigHts institutions: 
aRtiCles and WoRking papeRs, 1, 2–3 (Birgit Lindsnaes et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter danisH 
CentRe WoRking papeRs].
13. int’l CounCil on Hum. Rts. pol’y, peRfoRmanCe & legitimaCy: national Human RigHts institu-
tions 92 (2d ed. 2000).
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configuration that qualifies it as an NHRI. Most notable is the institution’s 
prosecutorial authority, and following a constitutional revision, an explicit 
mandate “to examine the observance of the human rights provisions in the 
Swedish Constitution by the administration.”14 
The Danish model is considered the modern paradigm ombudsman 
design, departing significantly from Swedish antecedents; prosecutorial 
authority is jettisoned along with reduced special powers and a formal 
mandate over administrative fairness, not legality. However, the office retains 
robust investigative powers, and while not formally ascribed a human rights 
mandate, in practice the office may perform a core human rights function, 
for example, in its oversight of persons deprived of liberty.15 The insertion 
of classical ombudsmen into an increasingly potent human rights normative 
framework is evident throughout Europe. Following Finland’s revision of its 
constitution in 1995, the ombudsman was officially designated a human 
rights institution. The Norwegian office has also recently been given an ex-
press human rights mandate. The ombudsman of the Netherlands has also 
incorporated human rights norms into its resolutions.16
In 1962, New Zealand became the first commonwealth country to adopt 
the Danish ombudsman model. The UK, primarily due to its constitutional 
tradition of favoring political accountability and political control of power 
and the principle of ministerial responsibility to Parliament, deviated from 
the Danish model. In 1967 the UK created what is the most restrictive om-
budsman model in terms of jurisdiction and mandate. Most striking is the 
limited access of the citizen to the institution, whereby the citizen’s com-
plaint must first be directed to a Member of Parliament (replicated only in 
the French model). It is the New Zealand adaptation of the Danish model, 
not the British exemplar, which remains popular within Western Europe 
and among commonwealth countries. Such emulation may also explain 
the frequent occurrence of multiple institutions—both a classical or human 
rights ombudsman and human rights commission—operating within a single 
jurisdiction, as opposed to the unitary hybrid agency predominant in Latin 
America and Central and Eastern Europe.17
14. Reif, supra note 2, at 6.
15. ass’n foR tHe pRevention of toRtuRe, opCat CountRy status RatifiCation and implementation, at 
150 (12 Apr. 2010). This has been recognized in its accreditation in 2004 as the national 
preventive mechanism under the Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture 
(OPCAT). Id.
16. Linda C. Reif, Building Democratic Institutions: The Role of National Human Rights 
Institutions in Good Governance and Human Rights Protection, 13 HaRv. Hum. Rts. J. 
1, 34 (2000).
17. Id. at 10. In the case of Ghana the ombudsman institution was fused into a national 
human rights commission established in 1992. See Lindsnaes & Lindholt, supra note 
12, at 24.
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b. The Human Rights commission
Along with the classical ombudsman, commissions of inquiry have informed 
the contemporary configuration of NHRIs. The classical commission model 
is a body established by government, often for a finite period, to inquire into 
matters of public concern and to advise government on policy options.18 
The contemporary human rights commission has an express human rights 
mandate, may be appointed by the executive or legislature, is composed of 
representatives from government and civil society with human rights expertise, 
and has a mandate that may encompass an advisory, research, educational, 
and investigative function. Early national human rights commissions were 
established as standing commissions to inquire into discrimination and 
equality.19 Contemporary European NHRIs have been described as operating 
like ongoing commissions of inquiry.20
It is commonly claimed that human rights ombudsmen exist on a spec-
trum, with the classical administrative ombudsman at one end, and human 
rights commissions at the other.21 Similarly, in functional terms, a spectrum 
may be applied to human rights commissions: from those enjoying strong 
remedial powers to address individual complaints, to others that act as gov-
ernmental advisory bodies or educational research institutes. Some NHRIs 
might be more accurately described as research institutes or consultative 
commissions with an advisory or promotional human rights mandate, as op-
posed to the investigative faculties required to perform a regulative function. 
Such a model can be found in France (created in 1948), Denmark (created 
in 1987), Germany (created in 2001), and Norway (created in 2005).22 In 
contrast, human rights commissions in Namibia (created in 1990) and Uganda 
(created in 1995) have prosecutorial or court-referral powers more akin to 
the Swedish variant of the ombudsman.23 The broad range of models in this 
category reflects contrasting political contexts, in particular a variation in 
local existing democratic and human rights institutional frameworks.
18. Martin Bulmer, Introduction, in soCial ReseaRCH and Royal Commissions 1, 1 (Martin Bulmer 
ed., 1980). 
19. anne-elina poHJolainen, tHe evolution of national Human RigHts institutions: tHe Role of 
tHe united nations 16–17 (2006). These include the United Kingdom (created in 1976), 
Canada (created in 1978), New Zealand (created in 1978), and Australia (created in 
1981). Id.
20. Christopher S. Elmendorf, Advisory Counterparts to Constitutional Courts, 4 duke l.J. 
962 (2007).
21. Reif, supra note 2, at 8.
22. kJæRum supra note 9, at 8.
23. Marcus Topp, Uganda: Human Rights Protection by the State in Uganda, in danisH CentRe 
WoRking papeRs, supra note 12, at 169, 192; see also Kofi Quashigah, The Ghana Com-
mission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice, in danisH CentRe WoRking papeRs, 
supra note 12, at 199, 205.
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c. The Human Rights ombudsman
Linda Reif defines the human rights ombudsman as an institution that ex-
pressly has been given or that in practice undertakes two roles: to protect 
and promote human rights and to monitor government administration.24 The 
institution commonly reflects the classical ombudsman in its composition. 
This variant on the classical ombudsman model is elected by the legislature, 
has an express human rights mandate, combined with oversight over admin-
istrative fairness and legality and, on occasion, has a political accountability 
jurisdiction over issues such as corruption and electoral monitoring. The 
institution may also actively engage in human rights policy research, advice, 
documentation and educational activities. Investigative and court-referral 
powers are common within this group, although prosecutorial authority and 
jurisdiction over private entities and actors are rare.
The Portuguese Provedor de Justiça (1976), Spanish Defensor del Pueblo 
(1978), and Polish Commissioner for Civil Rights Protection (1987) were the 
first ombudsman models to incorporate human rights as an explicit standard 
of control. These three ombudsman models provided the basic configura-
tive template for many contemporary NHRIs, especially in Central Europe, 
Eastern Europe, and Latin America.25 The evolution of ombudsman design, 
from the classical to the human rights model, can be identified by three 
progressive “waves”:
1. The rule of law model (1809–1962).26 The paradigmatic model of the first 
ombudsman framework is the Swedish ombudsman. This model has relatively 
powerful jurisdictional authority, including the ability to prosecute public 
officials, oversight over administrative fairness and legality, and faculties 
exceeding soft legal powers.
2. The basic model (1962–1976).27 The spread of the ombudsman framework 
from Denmark to New Zealand introduced the institution to the Anglo-
Saxon world. The paradigmatic and enduring basic model that emerges in 
the second wave is the Danish ombudsman. This model removes coercive 
prerogatives, retains extensive powers of examination, has a mandate on 
administrative fairness rather than legality, and enhances a mediation func-
tion.
24. Reif, Building Democratic Institutions, supra note 16, at 11.
25. euRopean ombudsman-institutions: a CompaRative legal analysis RegaRding tHe multifaCeted Realisa-
tion of an idea 37–38 (Gabriele Kuckso-Stadlmayer ed., 2008).
26. Id. Other rule of law models in Europe include Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croa-
tia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, 
Montenegro, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, and Spain. See id. at 62–64.
27. Id. Basic models found in Europe include Andorra, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, 
Ireland, Iceland, Israel, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, and the UK. See 
id. at 61–62.
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3. The human rights model (1976–1987). The inclusion of the office in the 
post-authoritarian contexts of Poland, Portugal, and Spain provided the 
template for the human rights model. These institutions have at their core 
a human rights protection mandate, exceed the soft powers of the basic 
model, and introduce human rights standards as a primary and explicit 
standard of control. However, the assignment of powers equivalent to the 
rule of law model varies.28
The genealogy of the NHRIs outlined here provides the basic foundations for 
the eventual expansion of the institution’s mandate. However, the evolution 
of the institution does not in practice adhere uniformly to any one discrete 
categorization. Rather, the eventual structural baseline of the institution 
reflects a dialogue between international and domestic forces as new insti-
tutional forms are subjected to political negotiation.
III. PRocESSES AND MEcHANISMS of NHRI DIffUSIoN
In work on the international dimensions of democratization, emphasis is 
placed on repeating clusters and sequences within and across regions, as 
well as the presence of what has been termed “neutral transmission mecha-
nisms,” such as accelerating flows of information especially within regional 
contexts.29 More recently, in terms of predictive scope, recent statistical 
research suggests that once a norm is institutionalized, a strong predictor 
for whether an individual state will enact that norm is whether other states 
in its region have done so in the past five years.30 
The survey of the diffusion of 124 NHRIs in Graph 1.1 strongly sug-
gests such a contagion effect, especially at the regional level with a wave 
phenomenon of varying intensity across regions. Europe provides the most 
constant curve, while all regions show a marked increased in the mid-1970s, 
with Africa and the Americas experiencing rapid acceleration from 1990 
onwards. Interestingly, an incipient NHRI presence can also be found in 
Arab Group countries with human rights commissions established in Mo-
rocco (1990), Palestine (1993), Qatar (2002), Egypt (2003), Jordan (2006) 
and Saudi Arabia (2006).
28. Id. Human rights models also assigned “hard” powers commensurate with the rule of 
law model include the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Russia, and Slovakia. See id. at 61–65.
29. Laurence Whitehead, Three International Dimensions of Democratization, in tHe inteRna-
tional dimensions of demoCRatization: euRope and tHe ameRiCas 3, 6–7 (Laurence Whitehead 
ed., expanded ed. 2001).
30. Francisco O. Ramirez et al., The Changing Logic of Political Citizenship: Cross-National 
Acquisition of Women’s Suffrage Rights, 1890 to 1990, 62 am. soC. Rev. 735, 742 
(1997).
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Source: NHRI population data collected from ICCNI and NHRI Forum: 
http://www.nhri.net/.
Graph 1.1 Regional proliferation of NHRIs 1960–200831
Initial expansion of the classical ombudsman model was confined to 
the Scandinavian countries, with large time-lags between Sweden in 1809, 
Finland in 1920, and Denmark in 1955. This process of contagion spans 
146 years and is confined to a small cadre with clear regional and cultural 
affinities. The second wave transgressed Nordic frontiers with the establish-
ment of the office in New Zealand in 1962—preceding that of Norway by 
one year—and introduced the ombudsman to the English-speaking world 
of the Commonwealth. A single human rights commission was established 
in France in 1948, predating its successor by thirty years. The third wave 
of the mid-1970s saw NHRIs begin to undergo a global expansion, with 
the emergence of human rights commissions and human rights ombuds-
men. The third wave took on new momentum in the mid-1980s as NHRIs 
31. Regional group designations follow membership of the Council of Europe (COE) (http://
www.coe.int/), the Arab League (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_League), the African 
Union (http://www.africa-union.org/), the Organization of American States (http://www.
oas.org/), and the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific (ESCAP) (http://www.unescap.org/). The sample does not include non-regional 
members of ESCAP: France, the Netherlands, the UK, and the US. Additional NHRIs 
include: Andorra (included in COE group).
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began to diffuse to a multiplying array of loosely democratic constitutional 
regimes throughout the Americas, Africa, Asia-Pacific, and the peripheries of 
Europe. The 1990s and 2000s witnessed a deceleration, but also witnessed 
the appearance of the institution in a growing number of highly unstable 
and authoritarian regimes.
IV. INTERNATIoNAL oRGANIzATIoNAL PLATfoRMS AND 
NETwoRkS
Cardenas argues that international organizations, especially the UN, have 
played a crucial role in creating and strengthening NHRIs by means of four 
mechanisms: standard setting, capacity building, network facilitating, and 
membership granting.32 The UN first referred to the need for NHRIs in the 
second session of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 
in 1946 and the institution received intermittent attention over the next forty 
years.33 Despite the issuing of guidelines and statements regarding NHRIs, 
“during this initial phase, there were virtually no limitations on the definition 
of a national human rights institution.”34 The 1991 Paris workshop galvanized 
a new interest in NHRIs and provided a concrete—if imperfect—structural 
basis for NHRIs through the Paris Principles.35 
The UN definition of NHRI still retains a lack of precision. A NHRI is 
variably defined as “a body which is established by a Government under 
the constitution, or by law or decree, the functions of which are specifically 
designed in terms of the promotion and protection of human rights,”36 or, 
alternatively as, “a quasi-governmental or statutory institution with human 
rights in its mandate.”37 As Reif notes, “[T]he UN recognizes that classical 
and human rights ombudsmen constitute [NHRIs], along with human rights 
commissions and specialized institutions.”38 
32. Sonia Cardenas, Emerging Global Actors: The United Nations and National Human 
Rights Institutions, 9 global gov. 23, 23 (2003).
33. See Commission on Human Rights, adopted 21 June 1946, ECOSOC Res. 2/9, U.N. 
ESCOR, 2d Sess., U.N. Doc. E/RES/9(II) (1946); National Institutions for the Promotion 
and Protection of Human Rights, adopted 14 Dec. 1978, G.A. Res. 33/46, U.N. GAOR, 
33d Sess., 83d mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/33/46 (1978); Declaration on the Right to Develop, 
adopted 4 Dec. 1986, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., U.N. Doc A/RES/ 41/128 (1986).
34. Lindsnaes & Lindholt, supra note 12, at 8.
35. Id. The headline in the original Paris Principles, contained in the original report of the 
workshop reads quasi-judicial rather than quasi-jurisdictional. See id. at 11, n.25.
36. u.n.CentRe foR Hum. Rts., national Human RigHts institutions: a Handbook on tHe establisH-
ment and stRengtHening of national institutions foR tHe pRomotion and pRoteCtion of Human 
RigHts 6 (1995).
37. See int’l CounCil on Hum. Rts. pol’y, supra note 13, at 3.
38. Reif, supra note 2, at 94.
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The exponential growth in NHRIs has led to sustained interest within 
UN structures, with regular pronouncements since 1991 by the UN General 
Assembly, Secretary General, and Commission on Human Rights, as well as 
by UN agencies such as the UN Development Programme.39 The integra-
tion of NHRIs within the UN human rights machinery continues to evolve, 
most notably in the creation of an NHRI Unit within the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), NHRI monitoring activity on 
state compliance with treaty body norms,40 participation of ICCNI accredited 
institutions in the deliberations of the Human Rights Council (HRC), and, in 
particular, the newly established universal periodic review mechanism.
The UN may represent the most advanced organizational platform by 
which NHRIs have been diffused, but it is by no means the sole significant 
normative agent at the global level. The Commonwealth, the largest associa-
tion of independent states after the UN, has also supported the creation of 
NHRIs with virtually every member state having established the institution, 
although the institutions vary greatly in their adherence to the Paris Principles. 
International financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank (WB) have also promoted the ombudsman insti-
tution under the auspices of “good governance,”41 a normative framework 
distinct from, even sometimes at odds with, the human rights framework 
espoused by the UN human rights mechanisms.42
Furthermore, international non-state actors, such as Amnesty Interna-
tional and Human Rights Watch (HRW), have made efforts to incorporate an 
NHRI focus into their work.43 The HRW report on the experience of African 
NHRIs placed a sometimes unwelcome spotlight on the many challenges 
that confront individual institutions at the domestic level, challenges often 
not captured by UN formal peer review mechanisms such as the ICCNI. 
Norm entrepreneurs need not necessarily be organizations. This discussion 
would not be complete without consideration of another category of norm 
entrepreneurs, namely, individual NHRI advocates. During the late 1950s 
and early 1960s, the prolific publications in English of Stephen Hurwitz and 
Alfred Bexelius,44 the Danish and Swedish Ombudsmen, are widely credited 
39. Id. at 97–99.
40. See amRei mülleR & fRauke seidenstiCkeR, geRman inst. foR Hum. Rts., tHe Role of national 
Human RigHts institutions in tHe united nations tReaty body pRoCess (2007).
41. See Nick Manning & J.D. Galligan, World Bank, Using an Ombudsman to Oversee 
Public Officials, 19 pRemnotes (1999).
42. See Peter Uvin, On High Moral Ground: The Incorporation of Human Rights by the 
Development Enterprise, fletCHeR J. of dev. stud., 1–11, 3 (2002).
43. See Amnesty Int’l, National Human Rights Institutions: Amnesty International’s Recom-
mendations for Effective Protection and Promotion of Human Rights, AI Index IOR 
40/007/2001, 30 Sept. 2001; see also Hum. Rts. WatCH (HRW), pRoteCtoRs oR pRetendeRs? 
goveRnment Human RigHts Commissions in afRiCa (2001).
44. See Alfred Bexelius, The Swedish Institution of the Justitieombudsman, 2 am. J. Comp. l. 
225–238 (1962); see also Stephan Hurwitz, Control of the Administration in Denmark:
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with bringing the ombudsman to world attention and their names have duly 
entered ombudsman folklore. Within the NHRI community, key individuals 
have worked, often from within and across international organizations and 
academia, to champion these institutions throughout the world.
V. REGIoNAL oRGANIzATIoNAL PLATfoRMS AND NETwoRkS
Simmons has suggested that regional diffusion may play an important 
independent role in state compliance with international norms.45 In the 
democratization literature, the hypothesis that regional organizations, such 
as the European Union (EU) and Organization of American States (OAS), 
can have an important role in transition to, and subsequent stabilizing of, 
democracy has been convincingly argued.46 NHRI diffusion has occurred not 
only through organizational platforms but also via transnational networks, 
devised by NHRIs themselves. The transnational networks operate at the 
regional level to facilitate information exchange among offices, and also in 
some cases, to confer legitimacy in the form of peer review mechanisms 
of evaluation. The degree of NHRI interaction within different arenas varies 
from region to region.
The African human rights system has evolved over the past twenty-five 
years toward an established and potentially important arena for NHRI activ-
ity.47 However, the regional system is the subject of sustained criticism for its 
inability to censure rights abuses by member states, as well as for procedural 
issues such as delays in determining cases.48 NHRIs, however, have prolifer-
ated in Africa.49 In 2009, thirty-two of the fifty-three members of the African 
Union (AU), or sixty percent of this regional group, have installed NHRIs 
with the most common model being the human rights commission.50 Despite 
   The Danish Parliamentary Commissioner for Civil and Military Government Administra-
tion, 1958 J. int. Comm’n JuRists 224–43.
45. Beth Simmons, Why Commit? Explaining State Acceptance of International Human Rights, 
Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 28 (2002), available 
at http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/752__SimmonsWhyCommit.pdf. 
46. See Jon C. peveHouse, demoCRaCy fRom above: Regional oRganizations and demoCRatization 
(2005).
47. See obioRa C. okafoR, tHe afRiCan Human RigHts system: aCtivist foRCes and inteRnational 
institutions (2007). The regional human rights system in Africa is centered on the Afri-
can Union (AU), the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), and the 
regional human rights mechanisms, such as the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, and the recently established African Court of Justice and Human Rights. 
Id.
48. Rachel Murray, Recent Developments in the African Human Rights System 2007, 8 Hum. 
Rts. l. Rev. 356, 370 (2008).
49. See generally RaCHel muRRay, tHe Role of national Human RigHts institutions at tHe inteRna-
tional and Regional levels: tHe expeRienCe of afRiCa (2007).
50. Data compiled by the author from the Network of African National Rights Institutions 
(NANHRI), available at http://www.nanhri.org/, and from the African Union (see http://
www.africa-union.org/).
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this presence, participation by NHRIs in the African Human Rights Com-
mission’s work has thus far been minimal and not encouraged by member 
states.51 At the transnational level, the Network of African National Human 
Rights Institutions (NANHRI) was created in 2007 under the initiative of 
the Kenyan Commission, and replaced the largely defunct Coordinating 
Committee of African National Human Rights Institutions, established in 
1996. Collaboration, information-sharing, and networking between NHRIs 
in Africa has been poor. The NANHRI proposal drafted in 2006 recognized 
these shortcomings.52
The lack of an intergovernmental system for the protection of human 
rights in the Asia-Pacific region, and the unlikelihood of its robust mate-
rialization, has led commentators to suggest the advancement of human 
rights platforms at the sub-regional and national levels.53 In the absence of 
a regional mechanism, it is perhaps unsurprising that the impetus for the 
creation of human rights commissions has emanated from international 
arenas. Of the fifty-three countries that comprise the Economic and Social 
Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), twenty-seven regional mem-
bers, or fifty-one percent of the membership, have established an NHRI of 
some kind.54 The region displays high variation in types of institutions, from 
specialized quasi-ombudsmen agencies, such as the Taiwan Control Yuan, 
to the human rights commissions, classical and human rights ombudsmen.55 
The ICCNI currently recognizes fifteen institutions in the region as NHRIs, 
all with “status A” accreditation.56 
An alternative peer review mechanism is also available in the form 
of the transnational network of NHRIs, the Asia Pacific Forum (APF). The 
APF, created in 1996 with the support of the UN and spearheaded by the 
Australian Commission, is a membership organization that administers its 
own evaluation—according to the Paris Principles—of prospective and 
current members separate to, but in cooperation with, the ICCNI. The APF 
currently has fourteen members and three associate members, with one 
51. muRRay tHe Role of national Human RigHts institutions, supra note 49, at 47–57.
52. kenya national Commission of Human RigHts, pRoJeCt pRoposal: establisHment of tHe netWoRk 
and tHe seCRetaRiat of afRiCan national Human RigHts institutions 1–2 (2006), available at: 
http://www.nhri.net/pdf/Project_proposal_Establishment_Network_of_African_NHRIs.pdf. 
“Such weaknesses highlight the need to improve the capacities of these institutions . . . 
Collaboration, information sharing, and networking among NHRI’s in Africa has been 
poor. This may be explained largely by the absence of an effective structure to facilitate 
this.” Id.
53. Kluwer Law Int’l, National Human Rights Institutions: An Overview of the Asia Pacific 
Region, 7 int. J. min. & gR. Rts. 207, 258 (2000).
54. This does not include non-regional members such as France, the Netherlands, the UK, 
and the US. Data compiled by author from the United Nations Economic and Social 
Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), available at http://www.unescap.org/ and 
NHRI Forum, available at http://www.nhri.net/.
55. Reif, supra note 2, at 243.
56. See ICCNI, National Institutions Accreditation Status as of January 2010, at 1–2, avail-
able at http://www.nhri.net/2009/Chart_of_the_Status_of_NIs__January_2010.pdf.
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member, Fiji, suspended.57 The APF is one of the most sophisticated NHRI 
regional networks in operation. It maintains a high level of integration with 
international forums, and is recognized as an important source of technical 
assistance for regional offices, and as such is able, up to a point, to push 
for greater compliance with the Paris Principles.58 
The Council of Europe is the principal human rights body in the re-
gion and exercises influence through various treaties and enforcement 
mechanisms.59 The Council of Europe has been engaged in calling for the 
creation of NHRIs since the mid-1970s and twenty-six of the twenty-seven 
EU member states, or ninety-three percent, have established an NHRI.60 This 
figure excludes Italy, which features multiple ombudsmen at the local level 
but no national entity.61 Europe has the greatest regional concentration of 
institutions, with the ICCNI recognizing twenty-seven accredited institutions, 
although this classification extends beyond member countries and includes 
the sub-national office of Northern Ireland.62
The Council of Europe has also supported the European Group of NHRIs, 
a transnational network with forty-three member institutions. Of these forty-
three members, twenty-four are from member countries, of which thirteen 
member institutions are fully accredited. While the European group may 
be the principal NHRI network, prominent sub-regional networks are also 
in operation. For instance, the Eunomia project launched by the office of 
the Greek Ombudsman, in conjunction with the Greek Government and 
Council of Europe in 2001, seeks to strengthen ombudsman offices in South 
57. Andrew Byrnes et al., Joining the Club: the Asia Pacific Forum of National Human Rights 
Institutions, the Paris Principles, and the Advancement of Human Rights Protection in 
the Region, 14 aust. J. Hum. Rts. 63, 85 (2008). The Fijian Commission was suspended 
by the APF following the military coup of December 2006 and the undermining of the 
independence and credibility of the body. Id.
58. Id. at 91.
59. See Kevin Boyle, Europe: Council of Europe, OSCE and European Union, in guide to 
inteRnational Human RigHts pRaCtiCe 143 (Hurst Hannum ed., 2d ed. 2004). An extensive 
range of human rights are given legal status by the Convention on the Protection of Hu-
man Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, its Protocols, and The European Social Charter 
and its Protocols, and are enforceable through the European Court of Human Rights. 
Id.
60. See Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Rec. 757 (1975); Council of Europe, 
Committee of Ministers, Rec. No. R(85)13 of the Committee of Ministers to Member 
States on the Institution of the Ombudsman (adopted 23 Sept. 1985; Council of Europe, 
Committee of Ministers, Rec. No. R (97) 14, 30 Sept. 1997; Council of Europe, Com-
mittee of Ministers, Res. (99)50, adopted 7 May, 1999; See Committee of Ministers, 
Recommendation Rec(2004) 6 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the 
European Convention on the Improvement of Domestic Remedies, 12 May 2004, ¶ 
5.
61. Reif, supra note 2, at 126.
62. Data compiled by author from the Council of Europe, available at http://www.coe.int/; 
NHRI Forum, available at http://www.nhri.net/.
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Eastern Europe.63 Despite these advances in networking among European 
NHRIs, one observer concluded that efforts to enhance cooperation have 
yielded only partial results: “the network of European NHRIs has almost 
no institutional support . . . has no geographical base and relies on the 
willingness of the European Coordinating Committee, which employs only 
one person (half time).”64
Finally, the focus of international organization in the Americas is the 
Organization of American States (OAS), the Inter-American Commission of 
Human Rights and its enforcement arm, the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (IACHR). The Inter-American system has made significant advances in 
protecting human rights, especially since the demise of authoritarian govern-
ments throughout the region.65 Outside of Europe, the Americas display the 
highest regional concentration of NHRIs, with twenty-six of thirty-five OAS 
members, or seventy-five percent, having established the institution.66 The 
OAS has promoted the establishment of NHRIs in all member states since 
the mid-1990s.67 In turn, NHRIs have made sporadic use of their power to 
submit petitions to the IACHR.68 NHRI coordination has generally focused 
on regional platforms rather than the UN, reflecting prevalent geopolitical 
dynamics, particularly its strong ties to Spain. In turn, the UN has paid 
limited attention to NHRIs in the region.69 
Beyond the OAS, there is a plethora of regional and sub-regional peer 
networks operating in the Americas. Two prominent networks are the Ibero-
American Federation of Ombudsman (FIO) and the Inter-American Institute 
for Human Rights (IIDH). Originally, the IIDH was the technical secretariat 
of the FIO. However, the Spanish, upon assuming the presidency of FIO 
in 1999, successfully lobbied for the Secretariat to be moved to Spain. The 
resulting schism has had serious repercussions, with the Spanish-controlled 
FIO excluding all Caribbean ombudsmen, as well as those from the US 
63. See http://www.synigoros.gr/eunomia/. Members include Albania, Bosnia and Herze-
govina, Croatia, Greece, Kosovo, Bulgaria, and Montenegro. Id.
64. Gauthier de Beco, Networks of European National Human Rights Institutions, 14 euR. 
l. J. 860, 872 (2008).
65. See Tom Farer, The Rise of the Inter-American Human Rights Regime: No Longer a 
Unicorn, Not Yet an Ox, 19 Hum. Rts Q. 510, (1997).
66. Data compiled by author from the Organization of American States, available at http://
www.oas.org/; NHRI Forum, available at http://www.nhri.net.
67. See Support for International Exchanges Among Ombudsmen, adopted 5 June 1997, 
G.A. Res. 1505 (XXVII–0/97), U.N. GAOR, 7th Plenary Sess., U.N. Doc. AG/RES 1505 
(XXVII–O97) (1997); Strengthening the Role of National Institutions For The Promotion 
and Protection of Human Rights in the Organization of American States, adopted 3 June 
2008, G.A. Res. 2421 (XXXVIII–O/08), U.N. GAOR, 4th Plenary Sess., U.N. Doc. AG/
RES. 2421 (XXXVIII–O/08) (2008).
68. See Reif supra note 2, at 172–87.
69. poHJolainen supra note 19, at 110. 
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and Canada (with the exception of Puerto Rico). In response, the IIDH has 
developed a parallel network.70
VI. DIffUSIoN bY coERcIoN
This article’s analysis has explored a range of organizational platforms through 
which NHRI diffusion occurred. This section focuses on the mechanisms that 
shape the incentives, including the underlying preferences, of state actors 
as they decide whether to institute an NHRI. The underlying explanatory 
model of the majority of diffusion analysis is one focused on coercion and 
competition within the international system.71 Similarly, in the literature 
on democratization, a focus is placed on control, whereby the promotion 
of democracy by one country in another is levered by positive or negative 
sanctions. However, for the purposes of explaining diffusion of institutions 
such as the ombudsman, coercion is problematic and potentially does not 
apply to such phenomena, at least in its strict form. As a diffusion category, 
coercion lacks precision and is an over-simplification although it does, im-
portantly, grant the possibility of explicit external agency.72 
An indirect relationship exists between the ombudsman and three arenas 
of foreign intervention: colonialism, democracy promotion, and post-conflict 
scenarios. Coercive policy transfer was a common feature of the colonial 
era, with significant transfers of legal codes, governing institutions, curren-
cies, and bureaucratic structures from the center to the peripheral European 
colonies of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. In the post-colonial era, many 
former colonies continued to look toward countries of colonial, as well as 
cultural or regional, affinity for lessons on institution-building. Given the 
prevalence of the Westminster model of political institutions in former British 
colonies, it is not surprising to also find that many of the earliest ombuds-
men outside Europe appear in Commonwealth countries. 
The direct coercion of policy transfers, as occurred in Japan or Germany 
in the aftermath of World War II, is rare. However, recent events have seen 
a resurgence of such systemic engineering, most visibly in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. Democracy promotion is often associated with the projection abroad 
of institutions found within the US and the creation of new external arenas 
through which to project US interests.73 Despite the absence of a national 
70. Interview with Gonzalo Elizondo, former Director, Public Institutions, Instituto Intera-
mericano de Derechos Humanos, in San José, Costa Rica (1 Sept. 2007).  
71. See tHe global diffusion of maRkets and demoCRaCy (Beth Simmons et al. eds., 2008).
72. It may gain nuance by introducing other depictions of power—such as the popular 
dichotomy between “hard” and “soft” power—but in terms of explaining the spread of 
the ombudsman it may be more appropriate to combine coercion with the concept of 
institutional façade.
73. ameRiCan demoCRaCy pRomotion: impulses, stRategies, and impaCts 5 (Michael Cox et al. eds., 
2000).
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level human rights ombudsman or commission in the US, this has not 
prevented the implantation of an NHRI, the High Commission for Human 
Rights, in Iraq in late 2008, and a human rights commission was installed 
in Afghanistan in 2002.74 A similar dynamic of imposition by external actors 
can be observed in post-conflict scenarios. The following events have all 
encouraged the establishment or strengthening of NHRIs: 
•	 The	UN-sponsored	peace	agreement	in	El	Salvador	in	1992	(NHRI	created	
in 1991);
•	 The	Bosnia-Herzegovina	Dayton	Agreement	and	the	Paris	Peace	Accords	in	
1995 (NHRI created in 1996);
•	 The	Guatemala	peace	accords	of	1996	(NHRI	created	in	1985);
•	 The	Good	Friday	Agreement	of	Northern	Ireland	in	1998	(NHRI	created	in	
1999);
•	 The	 Lomé	 Peace	Agreement	 for	 Sierra	 Leone	 in	 1999	 (NHRI	 created	 in	
2002);
•	 UN	Transitional	Administration	of	East	Timor	(UNTAET)	in	1999	(NHRI	cre-
ated in 2002);
•	 UN	Mission	to	Kosovo	(UNMIK)	in	1999	(NHRI	created	in	2000);
•	 The	Bonn	Agreement	of	Afghanistan	in	2001	(NHRI	created	in	2002);
•	 UN	Mission	to	the	Democratic	Republic	of	Congo	(MONUC)	in	1999	(NHRI	
created in 2002—and decommissioned in 2005);
•	 UN	Assistance	Mission	for	Iraq	(UNAMI)	in	2003	(NHRI	created	in	2008);	
and
•	 UN	Mission	in	Sudan	(UNMIS)	and	the	Comprehensive	Peace	Agreement	
in 2005 (NHRI created in Southern Sudan in 2007).
These instances of common institutional forms have been imposed by co-
ercive external agencies. Irrespective of political, institutional, historical or 
cultural conditions, a coercive dynamic—although normatively desirable in 
the minds of the architects—is in play, and the resulting function is highly 
unpredictable. 
74. Lawson writes, 
[A]fter decades of Baath Party rule, [Iraq’s] own bureaucracy is politicized and corrupt. As a 
consequence, additional mechanisms will be needed to prevent and redress bureaucratic abuses. 
One such mechanism is that most Nordic of institutions, the ombudsman. Properly staffed offices 
of ombudsmen at the national and provincial levels would offer Iraqi citizens the opportunity to 
 register their grievances and seek effective administrative redress. Moreover, the office of ombuds-
man has to date proved quite adaptable to countries without a history of such institutions.
   Chappell Lawson, How Best to Build Democracy: Laying a Foundation for the New 
Iraq, 82 foReign aff. 206, 207–08 (2003).
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Conditionality, a significant sub-category of coercion, is a more op-
erational category that emphasizes degrees of external coercion through 
institutional channels. Conditionality refers to the use of coercion through 
specific conditions attached to the distribution of benefits to recipient coun-
tries, commonly administered by IFI and individual donor countries. For the 
concept of conditionality to have leverage, the specification of the obligations 
must be precise, and the enforcement method for non-compliance explicit. 
Conditionality, as it pertains to the adoption of NHRIs, is a limited terrain, 
given the peripheral nature of the institution, the limited material benefits 
such transmission implies, and the lack of a coercive mechanism in cases of 
non-compliance.75 The ombudsman has received attention from the World 
Bank, often attached as a component part to judicial and administrative 
reform packages.76 The institution can also be found in the harmonization 
programs that have accompanied the accession of new states into the Eu-
ropean Union (EU). In the case of recent accession states such as Bulgaria, 
and candidate countries such as Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, and Turkey, the establishment of the ombudsman is explicitly 
referred to in their respective harmonization packages.77
VII. DIffUSIoN bY AccULTURATIoN
Richard Rose has identified a range of micro-processes including copying, 
emulation, hybridization, synthesis and inspiration in his work on policy 
transfer.78 Zachery Elkins and Beth Simmons speak of “uncoordinated in-
terdependence” and draw attention to the important distinction between 
adaptation to altered conditions and learning, the predominant benefit of 
the former, being the conferring of legitimacy or “cover from criticism.”79 In 
work on constitutional convergence across states,80 the importance of refer-
ent groups is clear. Goodman and Jinks define acculturation as “the general 
process by which actors adopt the beliefs and behavioral patterns of the 
75. This is particularly true of human rights organizational platforms, such as the UN, which 
tend to favor an inclusive membership model that imposes a highly elastic conditionality, 
if any at all.
76. WoRld bank, goveRnanCe and development 24 (1992); see also World Bank, Fostering 
Institutions to Contain Corruption, 24 pRemnotes (1999).
77. See Comm’n of tHe euR. Cmtys., CRoatia 2008 pRogRess RepoRt (2008); Comm’n of tHe euR. 
Cmtys., tHe foRmeR yugoslav RepubliC of maCedonia 2008 pRogRess RepoRt (2008); Comm’n of 
tHe euR. Cmtys., tuRkey 2008 pRogRess RepoRt (2008).
78. Richard Rose, What is Lesson-Drawing? 11 J. pub. pol’y 3, 22 (1991).
79. Zachery Elkins & Beth Simmons, On Waves, Clusters, and Diffusion: A Conceptual 
Framework, 598 annals am. aCad. pol. & soC. sCi. 33, 39 (2005) (emphasis added).
80. Donald L. Horowitz, Constitutional Design: Proposals Versus Process, in tHe aRCHiteCtuRe 
of demoCRaCy 15, 31 (Andrew Reynolds ed., 2002).
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surrounding culture.”81 What all of these contributions share in common is 
a concern with the relationship of the actor to a reference group or wider 
social system. There is a propensity for institutional architects to emulate 
countries of colonial, cultural, or regional affinity, as well as the preferred 
institutions of dominant international actors. 
Such a framework emphasizes indirect but material consequences, such 
as status maximization and reputation costs, to explain adaptation to altered 
conditions within the international or regional social system. This provides 
a useful process-oriented explanatory framework with which to evaluate the 
diffusion of NHRIs across time and space. The global diffusion of NHRIs, 
the spread of the institution, and lines of influence are highly suggestive of 
an acculturation mechanism, increasing in intensity post-1990. In keeping 
with the self-determination and relativist mantra of the cold war, the UN may 
have professed support for NHRIs, particularly with regard to the protection 
of minorities, but few states were willing to implement them throughout this 
era.82 The classical ombudsman diffused modestly in the 1960s and 1970s 
but the French human rights commission institution of 1948 remained a 
solitary figure for thirty years. 
The challenge of state socialization is also marked throughout the 1980s. 
The appearance of the commission model in Togo and Benin in the latter half 
of the decade corresponded primarily to the perceived need of the ruling 
military elite to seek international legitimacy. However, in Benin, sustained 
pressure by the Benin Bar Association was also a factor in the appearance 
of the commission model.83 The first commission in Asia, created in the 
Philippines in 1987, occurred during transition to democracy. The degree to 
which the institution emulates the international UN guidelines contained in 
the 1978 Geneva Principles is highly indicative. Such phenomena may be 
synonymous with the intermittent appearance of “demonstration democra-
cies” in the developing world during the Cold War.84 
The viral contagion inducing the creation of domestic human rights 
instruments has also been evident among European human rights ombuds-
men since the early 1970s. The Swedish ombudsman office was provided 
with an explicit human rights mandate in the constitutional revision of 1974. 
This was followed by the creation of the Iberian human rights ombudsman 
in Portugal (1976) and Spain (1978) in the wake of post-authoritarian transi-
tions. The impetus for these innovative designs must be placed in the febrile 
81. See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 5, at 626.
82. Human rights commissions created in Canada and New Zealand in 1978 were heavily 
influenced by the race relations commissions of the 1950s, described as “anti-discrim-
ination commissions with a broad mandates.” See poHJolainen supra note 19, at 45.
83. HWR, supra note 43, at 337.
84. See edWaRd s. HeRman & fRank bRodHead, demonstRation eleCtions: u.s.-staged eleCtions in 
tHe dominiCan RepubliC, vietnam, and el salvadoR (1984).
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context of early democratization, as in the case of Portugal, a highly charged 
human rights discourse, and the desire to emulate European institutions.85 It 
is interesting to note that the other paradigm transition of Southern Europe, 
that of Greece in 1974, did not establish an ombudsman office until 1997. 
The human rights model was also replicated in Poland in 1987, two years 
before the first parliamentary elections. The Polish office provided an impor-
tant “demonstration effect” for other countries in Eastern Europe, beginning 
with Croatia in 1990.86
The institutional profusion of NHRIs in the 1990s is evident across all 
regions, even in the Arab world, with the creation of a number of human 
rights commissions in Morocco, Palestine, and Jordan during this decade. 
Growing leverage and sophistication of international organizational platforms, 
combined with domestic processes of economic and political opening, have 
provided the drivers for institutional implantation. They have also led to a 
general conformity, or isomorphism, across models within regional referent 
groups. Thus we see the Iberian human rights model largely dominant in 
Latin America (excluding North America and the Caribbean), the human 
rights commission prevailing in Africa and Asia-Pacific, and the Arabic 
world, and in Europe the human rights model throughout Eastern and South 
Eastern Europe. 
This phenomenon has continued to a lesser extent into the twenty-first 
century, especially in the outer boundaries of Europe and among Arab coun-
tries. The continuing creation of offices in Arab countries, as well as in Central 
Asia and the Caucasus, including Egypt, Qatar, Jordan, and Kazakhstan, has 
been actively promoted by the Organization for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe (OSCE), with significant US funding.87 The acceleration and de-
celeration of this wave of NHRI appears to bear out Philippe Schmitter’s 
assertion that the relevance of the international context may increase with 
each successive instance of diffusion.88 
To reiterate, the process of acculturation emphasizes the relational 
environment of the actor, not the content of the reform adopted. In this 
article’s discussion, little has been said of the process of internalization of 
new institutional forms that are critical to the stability and durability of NHRI 
reform. As Goodman and Jinks state, “the acculturation mechanism as such 
is neutral—under different conditions, it may yield normatively attractive, 
85. Walter C. Opello, Jr., Portugal’s New Ombudsman: A Preliminary Evaluation, 18 luso-
bRazilian Rev. 239, 251 (1981).
86. Evgeny Finkel, Defending Rights, Promoting Democracy: The Institution of Ombudsman 
in Poland, Russia and Bulgaria, 8 (Inst. Eur. Stud., Hebrew U. of Jerusalem, Working 
Paper No. 50, 2006).
87. Richard N. Haass, Toward Greater Democracy in the Muslim World, 26 WasH. Q. 137, 
147 (2003).
88. Philippe C. Schmitter, The Influence of the International Context upon the Choice of 
National Institutions and Policies in Neo-Democracies, in tHe inteRnational dimensions of 
demoCRatization, supra note 29, at 26, 39.
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unattractive or ambiguous results.”89 The state may adopt an NHRI largely 
as a response to altered conditions within its social system. However, the 
transmission of the policy to the domestic level, and the eventual content 
of that reform will be determined not only by international structural and 
normative scripts, but also by a broad range of internal political forces.
VIII. DIffUSIoN bY PERSUASIoN
Persuasion orientates the analysis toward an internal explanatory model. The 
focus descends to the sub-national level with emphasis on the compatibility 
of underlying preferences within states, and the content or values attached 
to the diffusing policy. According to this logic, persuaded actors internalize 
new norms and rules of appropriate behavior, and redefine their interests 
and identities accordingly.90 In the language of policy transfer, it is a process 
of learning where “[a]ctors internalize the principles and rationale of the 
reform when they accept and understand the need for reform, as well as the 
logic of the reform.”91 Theorists have argued that the process of transnational 
socialization may lead to the internalization of norms across international 
dimensions.92 This logic of diffusion places emphasis on the content of the 
norm and the receptiveness of the adopting country to the intrinsic values 
contained therein.
Implicit to the logic of this process of diffusion is the recognition that 
no two instances of adoption will follow the same logic of diffusion. Indeed, 
there is likely to be a “discount effect” as the rate of adoption increases. The 
underlying assumption that institutions are borne out of political contestation, 
and continue to be responsive to their political environment, suggests that 
the internalization of norms—as opposed to their initial diffusion—should 
not be conceived as a finite process with a standardized outcome or tim-
escale. As such, the concatenation of international norms to the domestic 
level will always be partial. This is a dominant theme in the literature on 
democratization, with theorists marking a significant differentiation between 
instrumental (electoral democracy) and normatively desirable (liberal democ-
racy) models of democracy. Diamond asserts that an incipient “democratic 
recession” is in motion partly due to a lack of internalization of democratic 
norms, especially in nascent democracies.93 
89. Ryan goodman & deRek Jinks, soCializing states: pRomoting Human RigHts tHRougH inteRnational 
laW 22 (forthcoming 2010). 
90. See Jeffrey T. Checkel, Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe, 
43 int’l stud. Q. 84 (2002).
91. See Elkins & Simmons, supra note 79, at 48.
92. See Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 4, at 895.
93. Larry Diamond, The Democratic Rollback: The Resurgence of the Predatory State, 87 
foReign aff. 36, 36 (2008).
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In the context of this article, persuasion is a unique category in the sense 
that it focuses on the outcome of diffusion as opposed to the process only. 
Persuasion does not neatly demarcate between the internal and external, but 
it ratchets up the complexity of interactions as international processes collide 
with domestic dynamics, thus generating new norms, demands, and expecta-
tions from below.94 In the modern social system, as previously elaborated, 
international processes and platforms have exerted an important influence 
over the initial diffusion of institutional forms. However, to account for the 
experience of these institutions during the design phase, and subsequent 
to activation, requires consideration of a primarily internal explanatory 
model. The ability of an imported institution to transcend the constraints 
imposed by an initial logic of coercive façade, for example, and attain an 
internalized structural and normative authority unforeseen by its designers, 
is a key dimension to this study. New institutional forms have the ability to 
redistribute power, and as such, are likely to meet robust resistance, but may 
also open up new opportunities. As Alejandro Portes writes: 
Institutional grafting takes place at the surface level of things and, as such, faces 
the potential opposition of a dual set of forces grounded in the deep structure 
of the receiving societies: those based on values and those based on power. . . . 
These plans do not necessarily backfire, but they can have a series of unexpected 
consequences.95
New institutional forms are unlikely to endure or function well without the 
development of an internal platform of legitimacy among a variety of stake-
holders. The notion of internalization is indicative of the need for some degree 
of persuasion or consent. Given the specialized institutional characteristics of 
the NHRI—in particular its lack of enforcement authority—consent is desirable 
and, in this respect, more relevant to its eventual function than compliance 
or conformity with international norms. This discussion moves the analysis 
beyond the scope of the present analysis of how norms diffuse among states 
toward questions of diffusion outcomes. More specifically, it emphasizes the 
role of domestic politics in understanding the ways in which diffused norms 
interact with domestic political forces to shape NHRI outcomes. 
94. See Roberta Jamieson, The Ombudsman: Learning From Other Cultures, 25 ottaWa l. 
Rev. 629 (1993). The Swedish case may be the only example of internalization in perfect 
isolation, but even here the exposure of King Charles XII to similar institutions in the 
Ottoman Empire is said to have inspired his thinking. Id.
95. Alejandro Portes, Institutions and Development: A Conceptual Reanalysis, 32 population 
& dev. Rev. 233, 243 (2006).
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IX. PoLITIcAL REGIMES AND NHRIS
Once the preserve of a small clique of Western countries, NHRIs are now 
a truly global phenomena established in a wide array of political regimes. 
As Graph 1.2 shows, according to Polity IV there were ninety-nine electoral 
democracies worldwide in 2005, while the number of one or more NHRIs 
written into law within a single jurisdiction totalled 120. The task of classifying 
political regimes by refining the classic procedural definition of democracy 
advanced by Dahl has preoccupied political scholars for decades.96 A substan-
tial literature exists on the many subtype classifications of regimes—including 
electoral, illiberal, limited, controlled, hybrid, semi-democratic, virtual, façade, 
and others—often drawing on primarily procedural criteria.97
96. See RobeRt a. daHl, polyaRCHy: paRtiCipation and opposition (1971).
97. See David Collier & Steven Levitsky, Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation 
in Comparative Research, 49 WoRld pol. 430 (1997).
Graph 1.2 Global growth of NHRIs and electoral regimes 1960–2005
Source: NHRI population data collected from ICCNI and NHRI Forum: http://
www.nhri.net/. Democratic regimes follows the number of nations scoring 
five or higher on the Polity IV scale 1960–2005.
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The process of diffusing and activating new institutional forms is not im-
mune from domestic political conditions. The objective of this section is to 
demonstrate that NHRIs have diffused to a wide range of political systems. 
In doing so, some of the obstacles posed to rights protection and promotion 
by novel local, political, institutional, historical and normative conditions are 
raised. For the sake of parsimony, the article proceeds by using one of the 
most widely used measures of democratization in the literature, the Freedom 
House “freedom in the world” regime classifications.98 Using a seven-point 
ordinal measurement of ‘political liberties’ and ‘civil rights’ to survey 193 
countries, Freedom House constructs a composite measurement for both 
categories to produce a three-fold classification of political regimes:99
98. Similar to other measurements of democracy such as Polity IV and Polyarchy 1.2 (to 
which it is highly correlated), Freedom House departs from Dahl’s classic definition of 
democracy as well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See Gretchen Casper 
& Claudiu Tufis, Correlation Versus Interchangeability: The Limited Robustness of Em-
pirical Findings on Democracy Using Highly Correlated Data Sets, 11 pol. analysis 196 
(2003).
99. For a full explanation of the survey methodology, see fReedom House, fReedom in tHe WoRld 
2007: tHe annual suRvey of politiCal RigHts and Civil libeRties 982–1001 (2007).
Source: NHRI population data collected from ICCNI and NHRI Forum: 
http://www.nhri.net/. Freedom House country data has been calculated to 
reflect regime change over time at five year intervals. Time series data is 
not available for Bermuda, Hong Kong, Kosovo, Palestine, Puerto Rico, and 
Saint Lucia.
Graph 1.3 NHRIs by freedom House Political Regime classification 
(1975–2005)
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•	 Free	(1.0	to	2.5)
•	 Partly	Free	(3.0	to	5.0)
•	 Not	Free	(5.5	to	7.0)
The Freedom House metric considers a range of measurements under the 
rubric of political liberties (electoral process, political pluralism, and func-
tioning of government) and civil rights (freedom of expression and belief, 
associational and organizational rights, rule of law and personal autonomy, 
and individual rights).100 Graph 1.3 provides an aggregate distribution of 
NHRIs by political regime type since 1975, and is adjusted for regime varia-
tion at five-year intervals. The graph reveals an increase in NHRIs within all 
political regime categories, most notably among partly free regimes since 
1985. The number of NHRIs found in not free regimes has also doubled 
between 2000 and 2005.
The reliability of Freedom House data has been subjected to sustained 
scrutiny and the article recognizes—among a range of valid methodologi-
cal concerns—the pitfalls of both a democratizing bias, and the cloaking of 
important differences between political regime types within these three very 
broad categories.101 However, for the purposes of the present discussion, 
the framework is sufficiently suggestive across space and time to broadly 
delineate NHRIs along the dimension of their political environments.
Unlike in earlier decades, it is increasingly difficult to equate NHRIs 
with free regimes or political systems that display a largely consolidated, 
stable, and comprehensive adherence to the principles of liberal democracy. 
Rather, NHRIs are becoming increasingly synonymous with a wide range of 
what may be termed hybrid democratic regimes. These loosely democratic 
constitutional regimes display a variation in terms of regime stability, rights 
observation, and adherence to democratic precepts, such as the rule of law 
and political accountability. The consequence of this contemporary trend is 
to endow NHRIs with an increasingly complex array of competing demands 
and expectations in international and domestic arenas. The neutrality of the 
normative scripts attached to the institution by organizational platforms, with 
their implicit teleology of value homogeneity, is increasingly contested by 
adoptive contexts.102
100. For a comprehensive discussion of the Freedom House measurements and methodology 
see Joseph E. Ryan, Survey Methodology, 25 fReedom Rev. 9, 10–11 (1994).
101. See Gerardo L. Munck & Jay Verkuilen, Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: 
Evaluating Alternative Indices, 35 Comp. pol. st. 5, 14, 20–21 (2002).
102. Important differences across contexts cautions against the overtones of value homogene-
ity sometimes found in intra-regional practitioner material. See, e.g., QuóRum (Revista), 
las defensoRías del pueblo y la pRoteCCión de los deReCHos Humanos 11 (2008).
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Table 1.1 identifies a basic correlation between NHRI type and regime 
type. Despite the presence of all NHRI types in all three regime categories, 
the classical ombudsman continues to predominate in “free” regimes, increas-
ingly operating in conjunction with a human rights commission model. The 
human rights ombudsman and commission are the NHRI of choice for many 
“partly free” regimes inspired by a confluence of international factors, the 
former especially prevalent in the post-authoritarian terrain of Eastern and 
Central Europe, and in Latin America. It appears the human rights commis-
sion is the standard template for those “not free” regimes to have established 
the institution. This could be due to the fact that the generic commission 
model is viewed as an advisory body (with no investigatory powers) while 
all human rights ombudsmen have investigatory powers.103
X. NHRIS AND PoLITIcAL REGIMES IN 2008
In 2008 the Freedom House report surveyed 193 countries and fifteen related 
and disputed territories, resulting in ninety countries being classed as free, 
sixty countries as partly free, and forty-three countries as not free. Of the 193 
countries, 121 countries were considered to qualify as electoral democracies, 
located somewhere in between the non-democratic and liberal polarities of 
the one to seven scale. Of the ninety countries rated free by Freedom House 
in 2008, sixty-three countries have established an NHRI. This group contains 
many political systems commonly associated with the first or second wave 
          Political liberties                     Civil rights 
           average score                      average score
Classical Ombudsmen (15 NHRIs)  1.2   1.2
Human Rights Ombudsmen (43 NHRIs)  2.7   2.8
Human Rights Commissions (63 NHRIs)  3.7   3.4
Source: Sample of 121 NHRIs from ICCNI and NHRI Forum: http://www.nhri.net/. Freedom 
House data from Freedom in the World Survey 2008.
Table 1.1 
NHRI type and regime type following freedom House classifications 2008 
103. I am grateful to Linda C. Reif for this observation. Email from Linda C. Reif, Prof. of 
Law, University of Alberta, to Thomas Pegram, Research Fellow, New York University 
School of Law (10 Mar. 2009, 18:25:00 EST) (on file with author).
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of democracies, following Huntington’s three wave metaphor.104 The high 
political liberties and civil rights scores in this category are indicative of the 
enduring characteristics of many of these democracies. As stated earlier, the 
enduring classical model, or second generation of ombudsmen—found for 
the most part in democracies with the highest score on political and civil 
indicators—is particularly common to Western Europe. 
Despite base line commonalities across regimes, this category of insti-
tution reveals considerable political, institutional, historical, and cultural 
diversity. The result of international diffusion has been to borrow institu-
tional forms from established, highly-structured democracies, and extend 
them into a diverse group of political systems that nevertheless may be 
considered broadly stable, democratic, and governed by the rule of law. 
The structural and normative conditions commonly associated with the 
Western NHRI decisively part company from its diffused counterparts in 
at least three key areas. First, in countries where the state has traditionally 
neglected the institutional sphere of representative democracy, or actively 
perpetrated systematic and widespread human rights violations, an institution 
such as an NHRI may assume an additional resonance. Second, the NHRI 
has commonly developed in parliamentary systems, and the transplanting of 
the institution to a presidential setting introduces a destabilizing dynamic as 
the institution struggles to define its position in the political system. Third, 
this discussion raises the inherent problems associated with uprooting and 
transferring institutions intrinsic to a specific history and culture.
Of sixty countries rated partly free by Freedom House in 2008, thirty-
nine countries have established a NHRI. All of these models can be located 
in the third generation of NHRIs dating from 1976. There is also increasing 
instability among regimes in this classification with scores fluctuating from 
three to six. NHRIs established in this setting confront a range of systemic 
challenges along political, civil, and institutional dimensions, such as execu-
tive dominance, weak rule of law, and the systematic violations of rights. 
Regimes considered partly free range from weak liberal democracies that 
enjoy limited political and civil rights, to those regimes where such rights 
are severely curtailed, but may still be considered electoral democracies. 
Political systems within this group range from those that display a high po-
litical liberties average over time—such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Sri Lanka and 
Venezuela—to others beset by internal conflict—Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, 
and Colombia—and fractious post-conflict situations, such as in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.
This article does not discount the potential for NHRIs within this clas-
sification to be established, and subsequently contribute to processes of 
104. See samuel p. Huntington, tHe tHiRd Wave: demoCRatization in tHe late tWentietH CentuRy 
(1991).
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rights protection and promotion, given that many of these countries may 
be considered basically free by Freedom House standards. However, these 
ranges of political systems are, for the most part, recently democratized and 
show variation over time. This may fundamentally impact the autonomy and 
institutionalization of new institutions. Further complications arise from the 
diversity of political systems—with presidential authority being particularly 
acute in many African and Latin American countries—legal systems—with 
the spread of the ombudsman to both civil and common law jurisdictions—
and finally, cultural diversity, in cases as diverse as Ethiopia, Jordan, and 
Morocco. 
Many of the institutions in this classification were instituted following the 
Paris Principles of 1991 and in turn contain an explicit human rights mandate 
in their title. The nomenclature of the office in all three classifications of 
regime is suggestive of the normative demands and expectations attached 
to the office. Beyond the title of Ombudsman, Mediator, and Commissioner 
found in Europe, the translation of the office to Africa, Asia-Pacific, Eastern 
Europe, and Latin America has resulted in titles as diverse as Protector, 
Defender, Prosecutor, Advocate, and in Andorra, “The Person Who Reasons 
In Favour of the Citizen.” Such assertive titles are a reflection of internal 
demand and expectations often driven by historically antagonistic relation-
ships between state and citizen. However, the titles of the office can also 
be construed as responding to external incentives, such as the proliferation 
of human rights institutions accelerating rapidly post-1991, and in the cases 
of Tanzania and Mauritania, explicit reference to the World Bank maxims 
of good governance, poverty, and social inclusion. 
Of forty-three countries rated not free by Freedom House in 2008, 
seventeen countries have established a NHRI. There is a surprisingly high 
number of human rights commissions in regimes that are considered not 
free, thus failing to meet the basic criteria for electoral democracy. Given 
the conditions under which these institutions operate, evaluating the manner 
of their diffusion and institutionalization can prove problematic. Practical 
challenges include access to reliable information, level of adversity con-
fronted by the institution, and the likelihood that these institutions exist as 
little more than regime façades. 
Scant literature exists on these cases, although some are formally rec-
ognized by the ICCNI—including Chad, Sudan, and Rwanda. The exception 
to this rule may be the Kosovo Ombudsperson, which has received some 
attention as a post-conflict protagonist in domestic and international debate.105 
Furthermore, the Human Rights Watch publication “Protectors or Pretend-
ers” has provided a valuable and sobering assessment of the challenges 
105. See Christopher P. M. Waters, ‘Kosovanizing’ the Ombudsperson: Implications for Kosovo 
and Peacekeeping, 15 int’l peaCekeeping 648 (2008).
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confronted by many of these institutions in Africa. The report documents 
important signs of progress in the face of adversity, as well as highlighting 
inauspicious beginnings. As one extract on Togo reads: 
In 1987, Yao Agboyibor and Aboudou Assouma represented Togo at the UN 
Commission on Human Rights. On their return from Geneva, they proposed 
the human rights commission to President Eyadema, largely as a means of “re-
sponding to the wishes of the international community,” according to Aboudou 
Assouma. President Eyadema responded positively. “I’m a soldier,” he reportedly 
told Assouma, “you tell me what to do.”106
XI. NEGATIVE cASES: THE AbSENT INSTITUTIoN
Despite the prevalence of NHRIs across political, regional, and cultural juris-
dictions there remain many countries that have not instituted a national level 
human rights instrument in accordance with the Paris Principles. Prominent 
among the twenty-seven countries classified as Free by Freedom House in 
2008 that have not instituted an ombudsman or commission model at the 
national level are Brazil, Chile, and the US. In the Partly Free classification 
twenty-one countries, primarily in Africa and the Asia-Pacific, have not estab-
lished an NHRI of some description. These include Mozambique, Comoros, 
Guinea-Bissau, Singapore, and Yemen. Only in the Not Free category do a 
majority of countries not have a national-level NHRI.107 Countries such as 
China and Cuba are emblematic exceptions to the general expansion of the 
western liberal model.108 
It is not within the scope of this article to elaborate on why these states 
have resisted the international momentum behind NHRIs. Particularly in-
triguing are the few states that can be included at least loosely within, or 
aspiring to, the liberal internationalist social system. One can speculate on 
a number of potentially inhibiting factors. There may be a desire to remain 
unique or outside international norms. A “fatigue effect” may also be felt 
by a region saturated by these innovations. The existence of an existing 
institutional framework may be considered adequate to the task. Structural 
obstacles such as a federal system of governance has, in the case of Brazil 
and the US, led to the creation of ombudsman offices at the state, but not 
106. See HRW, supra note 43, at 337.
107. Data by author compiled from NHRI Forum, available at http://www.nhri.net; Freedom 
House survey data for 2008, available at http://www.freedomhouse.org.
108. See debating Cuban exCeptionalism (Bert Hoffman & Laurence Whitehead eds., 2007); see 
also G. John Ikenberry, The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal 
System Survive?, 87 foReign aff. 23 (Jan./Feb. 2008).
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at the national level.109 There may be normative resistance at the regional or 
national level, whereby prevailing values are resistant, or even antithetical, 
to those associated with such institutions. 
XII. coNcLUDING THoUGHTS
The findings of this article point not to absolutes, but rather to questions of 
degree. NHRIs assume distinct institutional forms, a spectrum commonly 
devised with reference to the inclusion of an explicit human rights mandate in 
the case of the classical ombudsman, and to the independence and breadth 
of powers built in to alternate human rights commissions. The historical 
origins of the institution, traced to nineteenth century antecedents of public 
commissions of inquiry and ombudsmen, provide a point of departure to 
explore competing demands and expectations placed on the institution. The 
commission model is imbued with an explicit political mandate connected 
to its role as an advisory body to government on matters of public policy. In 
contrast, the ombudsman is traditionally perceived as a technocratic admin-
istrative entity operating horizontally within the public structures—albeit, at 
least in the case of the Swedish model, one with teeth. Both entities derive 
a dual authority from their standing as government bodies as well as a verti-
cal interaction with the citizenry. In turn, NHRIs have proven highly pliable 
to adapting to new political conditions. Interestingly, innovative adaptation 
of institutional form is not solely the preserve of recent NHRIs. Rather, it 
is observable, to varying degrees, from the reform of the classical model 
of Sweden to the enhanced judicial prerogatives of the Spanish model and 
prosecutorial authority of the Ugandan office. 
With respect to drivers of institutional innovation, this article has iden-
tified a sophisticated array of organizational frameworks operating within 
the international social system. From the sporadic development of a NHRI 
normative framework within the UN and early ombudsman advocates of 
the Cold War era, NHRI diffusion is now harnessed by an increasingly so-
phisticated range of platforms, from international and regional governmental 
institutions, to international financial institutions and nongovernmental enti-
ties. In turn, the normative precision of NHRI form and function has been 
enhanced, most visibly in the form of the Paris Principles. The transmission 
of normative templates may initially be channeled through such organiza-
tional platforms. However, arguably the most significant recent advances of 
standard setting, capacity building, and network facilitating are occurring 
109. It is interesting to note that even at the state level there are very few ombudsmen in the 
legislative-public sector arena in Brazil or the US. I am grateful to Linda C. Reif for this 
observation. See Reif email, supra note 103.
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as much within regional NHRI peer networks as at the inter-governmental 
level. The APF offers a parallel standard setting mechanism in the Asia-Pacific 
to the ICCNI, with some success. In Latin America it is the FIO, not UN or 
OAS, which most closely coordinates the activity of NHRIs in the region. 
This reflects the strong regional and cultural affinity among these institutions 
and, at a practical level, the common challenges faced.
The genesis of NHRIs is acted upon by a confluence of factors, above all 
overlapping and interacting mechanisms of diffusion operating through orga-
nizational platforms. Diffusion theory provides a valuable point of departure 
for this analysis. The article draws on three broad categories of mechanisms 
in the literature: coercion, acculturation, and persuasion. Given the scope 
of the article, the objective has been to contrast these distinctive logics of 
diffusion, as opposed to extrapolating on the intricacies of any particular 
instance, or of the overall historical pattern. However, the findings suggest 
that the logic of diffusion in any one instance will differ to any other. The 
configuration of mechanisms, and the form of transmission they take, are 
likely to be informed by both domestic and, to a lesser extent, international 
conditions. Such a process suggests these mechanisms are not discrete cat-
egories easily amenable to empirical testing, but instead are prone to overlap, 
complementarities, and counteractions. In the case of NHRI diffusion, the 
article argues that coercion in its most simplistic form has limited utility in 
explaining their transmission, except possibly in situations of extremis such 
as post-conflict external intervention. Diffusion by acculturation and persua-
sion are more promising avenues of inquiry.
The co-variation of NHRI diffusion by regional clusters and circumscribed 
time frames strongly suggests an acculturation mechanism at work. However, 
the notion of acculturation as a neutral transmission mechanism must contend 
with the political negotiation that informs the outcome or establishment of 
the NHRI in the adopting state. This article has demonstrated that far from 
being a Western democratic phenomenon, the NHRI form can now be 
found in an eclectic range of regime types. While powerful countervailing 
domestic forces in more adverse contexts may effectively neuter some of 
these institutions at birth, others have emerged structurally intact and made 
important contributions to human rights protection and political account-
ability at the domestic level. Internal political forces may largely govern 
the outcome of the diffusion of new institutional forms across international 
boundaries. However, international context matters.
